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The Impact of Vulnerability and Resilience to Environmental Changes on Mobility 
Patterns in West Africa* 
 
Caroline Zickgraf, Sara Vigil, Florence de Longueville, Pierre Ozer, and François Gemenne† 
Abstract 
From the Sahel to the coast, West Africa is experiencing a variety of environmental change impacts, 
whether resulting from slow-onset changes or sudden shocks. They are significantly influencing migration 
patterns in and out of West Africa. In this region where natural resources form the foundation of livelihoods 
and food security (fishing and agriculture), the relationship between environmental changes and 
socioeconomic vulnerabilities is of particular concern. Environmental degradation affects populations' 
vulnerability and resilience capacity in complex ways. The presence of multiple environmental trends and 
shocks varies geographically. While desertification and droughts are of prime importance for some, floods, 
coastal erosion, and sea level rise are the main hazards for others. Even within local populations affected 
by the same climatic threats, their vulnerability and likelihood to migrate are affected by their 
socioeconomic status, their dependence on natural resources, and their demographic characteristics. Given 
the differentiated vulnerabilities and capacities for resilience, policy must be adapted and implemented 
according to particular populations and needs. Policy makers must also consider vulnerability as it is 
perceived by those affected. Therefore, environmental mobility cannot be treated as a strictly rational 
behaviour based on actual vulnerability. Local populations must be educated about current and expected 
changes to their natural environments to facilitate better-informed mobility decisions. Migration can also 
offer a significant tool with which local populations can increase their resilience to socio-environmental 
changes. Building infrastructure and establishing protection mechanisms for migrants and displaced 
persons is a necessary step in mitigating future risk.  Regional authorities must work together to build the 
resilience of sending communities to climatic shocks, but they must also facilitate migration as an 
adaptation strategy by recognizing the development potential of remittances. These policy interventions 
may help decrease the potential for the creation of “trapped” populations, be they trapped in areas of 
origin, in transit, or in destination areas. 
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West Africa is one of the most dynamic regions in which to examine the human impacts of climate change. 
From the Sahel to its coasts, it faces the many manifestations of climate change, including sea level rise, 
soil salinization, floods, drought, desertification, intensifying winds, and heat waves (IPCC 2014; DARA 
2013). Moreover, the consequences of climate change are only one part of the current processes of 
environmental degradation affecting the region. Taken together, these environmental changes are 
significantly influencing mobility patterns in West Africa. Yet, although environmental degradation acts as 
one driver of regional mobility, it cannot be isolated from other political, social, economic, and demographic 
pressures that together shape migration patterns (Black et al. 2011). In a region where natural resources 
(for example, fishing and agriculture) form the foundation of livelihoods and food security, the relationship 
between environmental change and socioeconomic vulnerability is of particular concern, and will be a key 
feature in this paper.  
 
This paper provides an analysis of vulnerability and resilience to environmental change in relation to 
mobility patterns in West Africa. The 2014 IPCC report defined vulnerability as “the propensity or 
predisposition to be adversely affected. Vulnerability encompasses a variety of concepts and elements 
including sensitivity or susceptibility to harm and lack of capacity to cope and adapt” (IPCC 2014, 5) and 
resilience as “the capacity of social, economic, and environmental systems to cope with a hazardous event 
or trend or disturbance, responding or reorganizing in ways that maintain their essential function, identity, 
and structure, while also maintaining the capacity for adaptation, learning, and transformation” (IPCC 2014, 
5). 
 
The following analysis first provides an overview of environmental change (both slow-onset processes and 
sudden climatic events) before detailing its role in driving internal and international mobility. Because the 
relationship between vulnerability, resilience, and mobility in the region cannot be adequately addressed 
without considering the variations among and within populations, this discussion draws from four case 
studies based on extensive field experience in West African countries. Each case study takes a distinct 
methodological and disciplinary approach to analyzing the impacts of environmental degradation on the 
vulnerability and resilience of communities, households, and individuals and their relationship with 
migration. The diversity of methods seeks to grasp the different dimensions of the interplay between 
environmental change, resilience, and vulnerability that are brought together in this paper. This mixed-
methods approach should allow a more comprehensive view of this interplay in the region to be provided, 
moving beyond the particularities of each case study. 
The objective of such an approach is to reflect the diversity of environmental migration flows in the region 
specifically tied to slow-onset environmental changes by touching upon different environmental stressors, 
economic sectors tied to natural resources, and the heterogeneity of vulnerability and resilience among 
local populations as it affects their mobility responses. In addition to demonstrating the complexity and 
diversity of the environment-migration nexus across the region, several connective threads run throughout 
these case studies that are of critical importance to West African policy makers: the importance of local 
perceptions of environmental change and of differentiated and cumulated vulnerabilities within each 
studied population as they determine mobility decisions and outcomes for resilience.  
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2. Current Environmental Trends in West Africa 
A significant increase in the frequency and intensity of natural disasters in West African countries has been 
observed in recent decades and attributed to global warming (IPCC 2012). Floods, droughts, strong winds, 
and heat waves are the most tangible extreme weather events affecting populations (DARA 2013). 
According to data from the International Disaster Database of the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology 
of Disasters (CRED 2015), natural disasters such as droughts and floods affected more than 28 million 
people in West Africa from 2010 to 2014. Strong coastal erosion and sea level rise are further compounding 
the vulnerability of populations along the entire coast, from Mauritania to Nigeria (UEMOA 2010). 
Desertification and soil erosion are happening continuously as a result of the climatic events (Stringer et al. 
2011), adding pressure to food insecurity and thus further exacerbating the vulnerability of local 
populations (Ozer et al. 2010).  
 
A study on livelihood security in West Africa led by the United Nations Environment Programme identified 
19 “climate hotspots” severely affected by natural disasters and climate change (UNEP 2011). These 
hotspots are mainly located in the central part of the Sahel, Niger, Burkina Faso, northern and coastal 
Ghana, as well as in northern Togo, Benin, and Nigeria and often straddle international borders, highlighting 
that risk management requires an interstate response. These areas have been heavily hit by floods in recent 
years and also recorded significantly increasing temperatures and a substantial increase in the frequency 
of droughts. The latter primarily affect the most arid countries (Mauritania, Mali, Niger), which account for 
nearly 90 percent of drought victims (50 million cumulative people) since 2000 in West Africa (Gemenne et 
al. 2014). These recent changes are affecting the livelihoods of millions of people who depend directly on 
natural resources.  
 
The agricultural sector employs 60 percent of the workforce in West Africa while it contributes only 35 
percent of GDP (Jalloh et al. 2013). The national economies in this region are particularly vulnerable to 
climate change because the populations are heavily dependent on rain-fed agriculture. The effects of 
climate change are strongly felt by rural people, regardless of their geographical position and the reporting 
rainfall zone. A majority suffer from a decrease in the length of the rainy season caused by a delay of its 
starting date and an earlier end, an increase in extreme rainfall events, and dry periods within the rainy 
seasons that may compromise agricultural production. A majority of farmers in the Sahelian arid zone 
believe that precipitation changes have occurred during the past 20–30 years, whereas in wetter areas 
(Guinean zone) effects were felt during the past decade (Ozer and Perrin 2014; de Longueville et al. 2016). 
 
According to UN estimates, the population of West Africa increased from 86 million people in 1961 to 340 
million in 2014, and is expected to increase to 815 million people by 2050 (FAO 2014). Mainly cities will be 
affected by rapid demographic growth, partly because of rural-to-urban migration trends (Foresight 2011). 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, 70 percent of rural-to-urban migrants move into slums where populations are 
particularly vulnerable (UN Habitat 2010). Therefore, migration to urban centers can also increase the 
vulnerability of urban communities to climate impacts. The urban population accounted for 16 percent (14 
million) of the total population in 1961, 47 percent (159 million) in 2014, and is expected to reach 66 percent 
(534 million) in 2050 (FAO 2014). Urban areas are ill-equipped to absorb such population growth, and are 
simultaneously increasingly threatened by global environmental change (Foresight 2011). Furthermore, 
these demographic changes and associated vulnerabilities contribute to the decrease of cities’ capacity for 
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resilience. The effects of annual floods reflect the explosive growth of cities, poverty, and the lack of urban 
planning policies. Human activities are responsible for the increased flooding caused by urban sprawl into 
risk areas (floodplains of rivers, depression areas, axes serving as natural outlets of the water, and so on). 
Nouakchott, Ouagadougou, Cotonou, Dakar, and Niamey are some examples of cities more and more 
regularly affected by flooding, as are a large number of primary and secondary cities of all countries of the 
West African region (Ould Sidi Cheikh et al. 2007; Descroix et al. 2013). According to a report from the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the cities of developing countries with health services, 
housing, and good-quality water disposal systems will more easily adapt to climate change (IPCC 2014), but 
this unfortunately is not the case among West African cities.  
Current projections show that Sub-Saharan Africa will be the area most affected by climate change, along 
with small island states and coastal and deltaic regions (Gemenne 2011a). IPCC (2014) mentions that 
temperatures could rise by 3°C to 6°C in some parts of Africa, including the Sahel, by 2100, which is likely 
to be accompanied by a significant increase in natural disasters. The recurrence of extreme events makes 
people more vulnerable. Adverse effects are expected on major crop production and livestock and the 
availability of drinking water, and will probably cause the collapse of the fishing industry. In addition, 
climate change contributes to food insecurity and worsening health problems (IPCC 2014). Faced with these 
threats, policy responses are urgently needed because the effects of global warming are a serious obstacle 
to development and regional resilience. 
3. Environmental Context as a Driver of Migration in West Africa 
Although there is now consensus that environmental factors play a role among the many interacting causes 
of migration, debate as to their importance continues (Perch-Nielsen, Bättig, and Imboden 2008), given 
that human migrations are explained by a combination of factors—economic, political, demographic, 
social, and environmental (Black et al. 2011). In West Africa, population movements, including 
displacement, are caused by economic crises, armed conflict, generalized violence, violations of human 
rights, large-scale development projects, environmental change, and natural disasters (Ferris and Stark 
2012). The relationship between environmental change and migration is further complicated by the indirect 
nature of the impacts of many environmental changes (Mortreux and Barnett 2009; Foresight 2011). For 
example, it is through livelihood systems that migration is affected by rainfall variability (Warner and Afifi 
2014). 
 
The environment-migration nexus literature typically distinguishes between forced displacement and 
voluntary movement in response to environmental change, as well as between people who flee a disaster 
and people who gradually leave because of environmental degradation, but also between internal 
migration and international migration, and permanent and temporary migrants (Bates 2002; Gemenne 
2011b; Renaud et al. 2011). However, environmental changes include a set of different processes: rapid-
onset hazards, loss of ecosystem services, and slow-onset hazards that consist in accelerated or gradual 
degradation of ecosystems (Renaud et al. 2011). In response to rainfall variability for example, four patterns 
of migration can be distinguished in West Africa (Warner and Afifi 2014): (1) households that use migration 
to improve their resilience (successful migration); (2) households that use migration to survive, but not 
flourish; (3) households that use migration as a last resort, an erosive coping strategy; and (4) households 
that cannot use migration and are struggling to survive in their areas of origin. Whether migration is a forced 
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movement or an adaptation strategy depends on a number of factors, such as the type of climate shock, 
the characteristics of the affected population, and the capacity of institutions (local, national, and 
international) to prevent the adverse effects of climatic shocks (Coniglio and Pesce 2010).  
 
The concept of immobility is fairly new (Black et al. 2013) yet very important, as environmental change 
increases the vulnerability of people and can make them less able to migrate in a number of cases. This is 
particularly true in West Africa—several studies show that migration decreased during the severe drought 
years in the 1970s and 1980s in Burkina Faso (Henry et al. 2004) and Ghana (Van der Geest 2011). This 
decrease in migration can be explained by the fact that migration requires financial resources that cannot 
be mobilized in times of crisis. Research indeed proves that it is not generally the poorest people who 
migrate (Tacoli 2009). In some cases, the migrants themselves increase the vulnerability of their 
communities of origin because they represent a depletion of the workforce, skills, and wealth (Cissé et al. 
2011). But sometimes migration has conversely positive impacts on origin communities and on the 
environment in the origin area. Migrants can reduce the vulnerability of their communities of origin through 
remittances and information (Adger et al. 2002; Tacoli 2011). Thanks to skills transfer, migrants share new 
techniques for managing soil fertility, and as they leave they alleviate the pressure on local resources. This 
kind of positive feedback helps to maintain the livelihoods of original populations by improving both their 
living conditions and their environment. 
 
Floods are among the most frequent natural disasters in the West African region, and the resulting 
population dislocations constitute one of the most visible examples of displacement. The number of people 
affected by floods in West Africa has increased steadily since 1980. According to statistics from the 
Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) (CRED 2015), floods affected 13.6 million people in West Africa 
during the 2004–13 period, though not all of them were displaced. In total, 600,000 people were affected 
by the 2009 floods in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Niger, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. According to estimates by the 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), in Nigeria, 6,818,000 people were displaced because of 
natural disasters between 2008 and 2012. The devastating floods of September and October 2012 caused 
the displacement of 6,112,000 people in this country—representing 3.6 percent of the total population. 
Thousands of homes, bridges, and other infrastructure, as well as large agricultural areas, were completely 
devastated (Yonetani and Morris 2013). According to estimates, the number of people threatened by 
coastal flooding will dramatically increase along the Gulf of Guinea and the Senegalese and Gambian coasts 
(UNESCO 2012). In West Africa, 40 percent of the population lives in coastal cities, and it is expected that 
the 500 kilometers of coastline between Accra and the Niger Delta will be populated by more than 50 
million people in megacities by 2020 (Hewawasam 2002). Studies show that among African port cities most 
exposed to sea level rise, six are in West Africa (Lagos, Abidjan, Lomé, Conakry, Dakar, Accra) (Nichols et al. 
2008). Sea level rise can also cause soil salinization and thus damage land, agricultural productivity, and 
food security. 
Although most mobility related to natural disasters occurs within national boundaries, studies have shown 
that rural communities affected by drought and slow-onset events can cross borders, especially where 
borders are more permeable as in the Sahel (Findley 1994). Mobility due to economic, social, and political 
vulnerability can have indirect effects on resilience to environmental factors, just as environmental factors 
may aggravate existing and fragile social, political, and environmental conditions. For example, the drought 
that affected the Sahelian region in 2012 combined with the political instability and conflict occurring in the 
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north of Mali displaced hundreds of thousands of people from the drought-affected communities in the 
south and in neighboring countries. A special feature of West Africa is its unusually high level of 
intraregional migration, with the highest number of mobile peoples of any region in the world. According 
to the bilateral migration matrix developed by the World Bank (2011), more than 58 percent of migration 
flows in West Africa take place within the subregion. The importance of intraregional migration in West 
Africa can be partly explained by the creation in the late 1970s of an area of free movement of people 
within the Economic Community of West African States. In fact, migration between West African countries 
is mostly from neighboring countries (World Bank 2010). It is the only region of Africa where intraregional 
migration is greater than outward migration (34.5 percent, mainly to Europe) (Ndiaye and Robin 2010). 
Numbering some 8.4 million people, West Africa also has the largest stock of migrants of any subregion in 
the world (UN DESA 2009). Despite these statistics, lack of reliable data on population dynamics in the 
region (especially as they relate to environmental migration) makes it difficult to assess vulnerability and 
mobility on a regional scale. It is thus essential that governments cooperate to collect reliable data upon 
which policy makers can shape long-term strategies. Political, social, and environmental crises existing in 
the region will be exacerbated by the effects of climate change in the coming years, likely leading to more 
frequent migration (IOM 2014). 
4. Perception versus Reality of Rainfall Variability in West Africa 
Climate change has been affecting the economic and social vulnerability of populations for decades, 
particularly in West Africa where the populations are largely dependent on rain-fed agriculture (Juana et 
al. 2013). Economic loss, damage to water resources, decreases in crop production, and mortality are some 
of the direct and indirect impacts (Crétat, Vizy, and Cook 2014; Meehl et al. 2000; Mouhamed et al. 2013). 
Are such impacts due to increasing frequency of extreme events and climate variability, to growing 
vulnerability, or to both (Easterling et al. 2000)? It is currently difficult to answer this question because of 
a lack of thorough empirical evidence. What is more certain is that populations must adapt to 
environmental changes. In arid and semi-arid areas, climate change adaptation strategies implemented by 
farming communities vary according to region and depend on a multitude of factors, including cultural ones 
(Adger et al. 2009; Nielsen and Reenberg 2010). Temporary or permanent migrations are part of these 
households’ adaptation strategies to maintain their standards of living through the diversification of 
livelihoods (McLeman and Hunter 2010; Wouterse and Taylor 2008).  
 
An increasing number of studies about the impacts of environmental change on migration are available, 
but they are based on objective determinations of environmental changes (Foley et al. 2013; Ahouangan et 
al. 2014; Sow, Adaawen, and Scheffran 2014). Populations’ migratory responses are made based on their 
perceptions of environmental changes and their own vulnerability to them; thus, taking into account the 
perception of change by local populations can improve the understanding of the environment-migration 
nexus and help provide insights into the magnitude and character of future migration patterns.  
 
This case study therefore compares the perceptions of rainfall changes experienced by people in different 
climatic regions of West Africa with the actual trends recorded in the same period. Then, assuming that 
migration decisions are made based on the perception of changes rather than changes themselves, the 
second objective is to assess migration intentions as direct responses to future climate change to frame the 





A request by keywords was carried out using the Scopus and Google Scholar databases since 2000 to find 
studies on perceptions of rainfall change in West Africa. A distinction was made between studies in the arid 
zone (300–500 millimeters of annual precipitation) and in the semi-arid zone (500–900 millimeters). Results 
of these studies were compared with real climate trends available in the literature. The data on the 
intention to migrate were taken from socioeconomic surveys of the African Monsoon Multidisciplinary 
Analyses project conducted in five West African countries between November 2007 and June 2008. 
Questions related to intentions to migrate, either temporarily or permanently, in response to three 
potential situations—a drought, a more arid climate, and a more humid climate—were posed to 1,342 
households distributed in two climatic zones (Mertz et al. 2011). This analysis examines the main strategies 




Perception of rainfall change vs observed trends 
 
The literature review shows that the most important change felt by the West African populations is a 
decrease in total annual rainfall, but populations also perceived a decrease in the length of the rainy season 
(later starting date and earlier end date), and increases in dry spells during the rainy season and in periodic 
droughts and irregular rainfall (table 1). These perceptions show the same trends in the two climatic zones 
but are somewhat more pronounced in the arid zone than in the semi-arid zone. 
 
Table 1.  Perception of Change in Rainfall in Arid and Semi-Arid Zones of West Africa 
(percentage of interviewed people; if the total is not 100 percent, the rest is “without opinion”)  











(Akponikpè et al. 2010) 91 2 2 61 4 21 
(Mertz et al. 2009)    82 5 13 
(Mertz et al. 2012) 83 4 13 82 10 8 
(Diessner 2012) 90 6 3    
Length of the 
wet season 
(Akponikpè et al. 2010) 91 2 4 61 6 14 
(Nielsen and Reenberg 
2010) 
60 6 26    




(Akponikpè et al. 2010) 6 6 85 13 4 68 
(Nielsen and Reenberg 
2010) 
14 0 74    
(Mertz et al. 2009)    23 0 45 
(Mertz et al. 2012) 20 6 74 10 6 84 
  Later Stable Earlier Later Stable Earlier 
Start of the 
wet season 
(Akponikpè et al. 2010) 85 4 6 67 9 15 
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  Later Stable Earlier Later Stable Earlier 
End of the 
wet season 
(Akponikpè et al. 2010) 70 7 11 48 13 24 
There is an overall pessimistic perception of rainfall change. Results show that the population believes 
changes in rainfall have occurred (table 2) even though such changes in rainfall trends are not clearly 
reflected in climatic data (New et al. 2006; Lebel and Ali 2009). The differences between observations and 
perceptions are more likely a reflection of a progressive decline in socioeconomic conditions (resulting 
notably from a loss of profitability in the agricultural sector) due to other factors (demographic pressure, 
environmental degradation) co-occurring with climate change (Müller et al. 2014). The people of West 
Africa have become increasingly vulnerable because of the region’s population growth and poor 
infrastructure, and they will find it increasingly difficult to be resilient, even in the face of low-intensity 
changes (Müller et al. 2014). 
 
Table 2.  Significant Changes in Rainfall Felt by Populations in Arid and Semi-Arid Zones of 
West Africa According to Results from Focus Groups (the first change is the most important)  
  First change Second change Third change 
Arid zone (Ouédraogo, Dembélé, 
and Somé 2010) 
Decrease in 
rainfall 
Changes in the 
onset and offset 
of seasons 
Increase of dry 
spells 
 (Dieye and Roy 2012) Decrease in 
rainfall 
Irregular rainfall Changes in the 
onset and offset 
of seasons 
 (Tschakert 2007) Lack of rain Irregular rainfall Periodic drought 
 (West, Roncoli, and 
Ouattara 2008) 
Long-term 







and Somé 2010) 
Decrease in 
rainfall 
Changes in the 
onset and offset 
of seasons 
Irregular rainfall 




changes in the 
timing of rain 
Changes in the 





Intention to migrate in case of rainfall changes 
 
In response to a drought, a drier climate, or a wetter climate, migration is rarely the first adaptation strategy 
currently implemented by the surveyed population, but the intention to migrate is an important one should 
the situation worsen (or rather be perceived to worsen). In case of drought, respondents currently give 
priority to selling their livestock, but several strategies are often considered together. Temporary migration 
has been cited as the first strategy in case of drought by 24 percent of respondents, and in total 29 percent 
of respondents intend to use temporary migration in response to a drought in the future. In case of a drier 
climate, the first two cited strategies are search for new crop varieties and livestock sales. About 11 percent 
of respondents indicated that they would resort to temporary migration and 30 percent to permanent 
migration in response to a future drier climate; and temporary and permanent migration would be the first 
strategy for 6 percent and 13 percent of households, respectively. The intention to migrate also exists but 
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is less important in case of a wetter climate, with only 2 percent and 4 percent of respondents saying they 
would migrate temporarily or permanently. Some 36 percent of respondents intend to migrate temporarily 
in a rainfall deficit situation (drought or drier climate). In total, taking into account temporary and 
permanent migration, more than 51 percent of respondents plan to migrate if rainfall conditions 
deteriorate in the future. However, some people who do not intend to migrate may not have a choice in 
the future and may have to use migration as a survival strategy. Conversely, the intention to migrate may 
not translate into actual movements: people who intend to migrate may find themselves unable to do so, 
lacking the necessary means (for example, financial, social, and human capital). 
 
4.1.3. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Whereas researchers and stakeholders often consider the effects of climate change on the vulnerability 
and resilience of affected populations, this case study highlights the importance of taking into account 
populations’ perceptions of climate change given that their perceptions can affect their adaptation 
responses. A perfectly rational decision to migrate in response to perfect information on the actual climate 
event is not actually in the populations’ capacity to make, because it is their perceptions of change that 
drive their behavior (stay or move) rather than actual change. The conclusion of this study highlights the 
need for vulnerable populations to have better information to allow them to make better-informed policy 
choices. 
5. Case studies 
In the following case studies, we attempt to measure the intersections between environmental changes, 
perceptions of those changes, and mobility outcomes. 
5.1.   Environmental Mobility and Fishing Communities in Guet Ndar, Saint-Louis (Senegal) 1 
5.1.1.  Context 
Senegal’s coast, like that of many other coastal West African countries, is threatened by climate change 
impacts of coastal erosion, sea level rise, flooding, soil salinization, and increasing storm surges (Salem 
2013). Concomitantly, the Senegalese coastal waters have witnessed changes in currents, stronger waves, 
depletion of fish stocks, and decreases in maritime biodiversity. These visible impacts of climate change 
have been compounded by man-made environmental degradation, including overfishing by national and 
foreign industrial vessels and local changes to infrastructure such as the opening of a breach in 2003 that 
displaced dozens of villages in the Langue de Barbarie along Senegal’s northern coast (Tacoli 2011). These 
environmental changes threaten the livelihoods of the approximately 600,000 people directly or indirectly 
working in the Senegalese fishing industry (FAO 2008), increasing and diversifying existing mobility 
                                                        
 
1 . The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union Seventh Framework 
Programme FP7/2007-2013 under grant agreement No. 603864. 
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patterns. Yet Senegalese fishermen’s mobility responses and their effects on local resilience capacity have 
received little attention.  
5.1.2. Methods 
To examine the migratory patterns associated with man-made environmental degradation and climate 
change impacts in West African fishing communities, a qualitative case study was undertaken in Guet 
Ndar,2 an overcrowded fishing quarter in Saint-Louis, Senegal. Along with an extensive literature review 
and document analysis, the primary tools of investigation were qualitative, in-depth interviews and focus 
groups with fishermen (migrant and nonmigrant), women working in the local fishing industry, and leaders 
of fishing associations. Local and national stakeholders, experts, community leaders, and researchers were 
also consulted in Dakar and Saint-Louis. The qualitative data were collected over a five-week period during 
the summer of 2014. Participants were selected using a network-sampling strategy, and insofar as possible 
maximum variation, in which respondents reflected different occupations, ages, gender, and geographical 




In 2008, UN-Habitat designated the city of Saint-Louis as the most threatened by sea level rise in all of 
Africa. The fishing quarter of Guet Ndar in Saint-Louis is particularly vulnerable to environmental 
degradation. This vulnerability stems, first, from the quarter’s location between the Senegal River on its 
eastern limits and the Atlantic Ocean to its west, leaving it with no territory to expand into as the sea 
advances. Piles of rubble and debris where homes once stood line the coast. Currently, those who live on 
the “front lines” of Guet Ndar are forced to build their own makeshift barriers to protect their homes from 
coastal erosion and sea level rise. In the south of Guet Ndar, women’s working spaces for fish processing 
are now tightly cramped areas, wedged between the sea on one side and a cemetery on the other. 
Therefore, some women have resorted to performing their work beside their homes, or commuting daily 
to a nearby newly constructed space north of Guet Ndar near the Mauritanian border. Compounding local 
vulnerability, the quarter is one of the most densely populated districts in all of West Africa, with more than 
25,000 inhabitants occupying an area 1 kilometer long and 300 meters wide according to regional statistics 
(CLUVA 2013; Ateliers 2010). The local impacts of climate change only exacerbate overcrowding, with 
coastal erosion forcing the growing population into an ever-smaller space. Furthermore, without an 
agricultural production program, almost all households rely on fishing in one form or another. The local 
population is also heavily reliant on fish for their own subsistence, being a hallmark of the daily local diet in 
traditional dishes such as Thiéboudienne. Guet Ndar’s inhabitants are therefore especially vulnerable to 
the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation because they threaten their local livelihood 
strategies, their lands, and their food security. It is interesting, however, that only two respondents in the 
study attributed environmental change in Guet Ndar in any way to climate change. Respondents cited 
overfishing by foreign vessels and other unintended consequences of man-made changes to the 
                                                        
 
2 . Interviews were also conducted in rural villages in the south of the Langue de Barbarie and two urban 
neighborhoods to the north of Guet Ndar: Ndar Toute and Goxu Mbathie. 
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environment (for example,, the opening of a breach in 2003 to decrease flood risks in the city) as the 
primary causes of environmental degradation, and thus the key challenges facing Guet Ndarians alongside 




As local livelihoods become increasingly difficult to maintain, building on a long history of fishing migration 
throughout West Africa, many Guet Ndarian fishers respond by traveling northward to Mauritania (Sall and 
Morand 2008), where infrastructure and livelihood opportunities are markedly better. Although some 
fishermen fish irregularly just across the Senegalese-Mauritanian border or obtain one of 400 licenses 
granted annually to fishermen to bring catches back to Senegal, the danger of fishing irregularly stemming 
from conflicts with the Mauritanian coast guards historically and contemporarily led most respondents to 
obtain contracts with Mauritanian factories. Lacking a strong fishing tradition, factory representatives are 
sent to the quarter to recruit the highly experienced Guet Ndarian fishermen. The primary international 
destinations of Guet Ndarian fishermen are the Mauritanian cities of Nouakchott and Nouadhibou. 
Although retired respondents had fished outside of Guet Ndar in Mauritania, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau, 
among others, the diminishment of local fish stocks because of climate change and overfishing has 
increased fishing migration to Mauritania and for longer durations. Whereas retired fishermen had 
travelled for short periods and seasonally in the past, currently active fishermen are spending 10 months 
or more outside of Guet Ndar. Moreover, those who stay in Guet Ndar and fish locally no longer abstain 
from fishing during maritime reproductive months because of the diminished returns the rest of the year 
and a lack of local infrastructure to preserve their catches, which in turn exacerbates maritime resource 
depletion. 
 
Fishermen preferred to remain in Guet Ndar; however, fishing migration allowed men to support their 
families living in the community of origin. Money earned by fishermen in Mauritania is sent primarily 
through informal channels to relatives who stay behind in Guet Ndar. These remittances supplement 
household income and provide for basic necessities such as food, water, and shelter, demonstrating the 
importance of migration for improving household resilience in the community of origin by decreasing 
residents’ reliance on the local economy. However, currency exchange rates weakened the potential of 
remittances and, additionally, differences among migrant fishermen led to varying levels of remittances. 
Irregular fishermen often have their equipment confiscated, and are jailed or fined by the Mauritanian 
coast guard, losing any earnings or assets in the process.3 Poorer artisanal fishermen who take up contracts 
with Mauritanian factories must pay off the debts they accumulate when taking on loans for fishing 
equipment (boats, nets, motors, and the like), which decreases their remittances capacity. Only the more 
successful fishermen, who own their own, larger boats ( 25-meter pirogues) and therefore are able to 
generate larger catches, are able to send greater sums back to Guet Ndar. In an important development, 
the last group is able not only to provide their families with basic necessities, but also to relocate their 
families out of Guet Ndar and away from the encroaching sea. In a gradual process (sometimes taking more 
than a decade), remittances are used to construct homes in other coastal districts perceived to be safer 
from sea level rise and coastal erosion. Although local authorities have made gestures toward establishing 
                                                        
 
3. Respondents who obtained a license to fish in Mauritania and return with their catches to Senegal also reported 
the same problems, citing corruption among Mauritanian coast guards. 
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residential developments for Guet Ndarians at danger of displacement, homes in these areas are often 
costly, and relocation remains out of reach for the households most vulnerable to climate change and 
environmental degradation, placing them at risk of becoming “trapped populations” (Foresight 2011). 
5.1.4. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Driven by residential destruction, demographic pressures, and concomitant economic strife caused by 
maritime resource degradation, urban fishermen and their families are highly vulnerable to the current 
impacts of climate change, which will only exacerbate migratory pressures in the future. To protect these 
vulnerable coastal populations, local and national governments must intervene to mitigate and adapt to 
the effects of climate change but also to limit degradation caused by man-made environmental changes 
(for example, overfishing by foreign trawlers, unsustainable fishing practices, and breach openings). As it 
is, other than erection of makeshift barriers, departure is often seen as the only solution for those who are 
able to do so.  
 
Environmental degradation is already significantly influencing both internal and international mobility 
patterns in Saint-Louis, Senegal. However, Guet Ndarian households’ vulnerability varies and so does their 
capacity for migration and building resilience. Active fishermen are able (if not always willing because of 
precarious conditions) to move up the coast to sustain their livelihoods, while those who are retired, 
elderly, or whose occupations are land-based are less able to migrate as an adaptation strategy and 
therefore rely on household members’ labor migration.  
 
However, even though most fishermen are able to embark on international labor migration in one form or 
another, only the most successful fishermen are currently able to relocate their families within Senegal. 
The case of Guet Ndarians therefore demonstrates the importance of integrating livelihood strategies and 
socioeconomic status variations into vulnerability and resilience assessments and local, national, and 
intraregional adaptation plans. Policies and government initiatives must also make relocation available to 
the most vulnerable households, those in imminent danger of displacement, and those without the capital 
to move out of harm’s way. However, any efforts to relocate fishing families must be accompanied by 
infrastructure that recognizes their dependence on the sea, making commuting to work accessible, for 
example. Furthermore, policy interventions that seek to limit the need for international migration must ask 
how the local fishing sector can be developed to absorb excess labor supply and to address inadequate fish 
stocks, such as through investment in preservation and processing factories and the halting or mitigating 
of unsustainable fishing practices, both commonly cited solutions among Guet Ndarian respondents. 
Finally, the connections between internal and international mobility patterns expose the importance of 
addressing environment-related population movements with integrated local, national, and regional 
solutions. As demonstrated by empirical investigation, these mobility responses are highly interrelated 
because international migration can facilitate internal relocation through remittances, and therefore 
cooperation among different levels of government and between countries is needed. Although Senegal and 
Mauritania recently increased the number of annual licenses granted for people to bring fish back across 
the Senegal-Mauritanian border from 300 to 400, further increases could improve the resilience capacity 
of local populations by stimulating the local economy, improving food security, and ameliorating precarious 
living and working conditions for migrant fishermen as well as local actors in the fishing sector. However, 
 12 
ongoing conflicts between the Mauritanian coast guard and Senegalese fishermen must be addressed to 
facilitate migration as adaptation. 
5.2.1 Migratory Responses to Agricultural Degradation and Transformation in the Region of 
Saint-Louis (Senegal)4 
5.2.2 Context 
Land remains the most fundamental productive asset in a country where more than 70 percent of the 
population depends directly and indirectly on agriculture for their livelihoods (Crabtree-Condor and Cassey 
2012). Climate change impacts together with lack of socioeconomic assets pose considerable challenges to 
the resilience of Senegalese populations. These preexisting vulnerabilities are amplified by a growing 
number of large-scale land acquisitions through which approximately 17 percent of the country’s arable 
land has been acquired by foreign and national investors since 2008 (Sy, Cissé, and Ba 2013).5 Tensions 
between formal and customary land arrangements have significantly increased, with the interests of local 
communities often subordinated to those of recently arrived corporations. Despite a growing literature on 
the complex links between environment and migration, scant attention has been given to how 
environmental degradation, land rights, large-scale land acquisitions, and migration interact. In a region 
where both climate vulnerability and competition for land play a defining role in livelihood sustainability, 
how do these variables interrelate to give way to new migratory patterns? This case study addresses how 
the combination of environmental degradation and large-scale land transactions in the region of Saint-Louis 
in Senegal has affected the vulnerability and resilience of populations and modified both in and out 
migratory dynamics.  
5.2.3 Methods 
 
Data were gathered through an intensive review of the existing literature on the topic. Media reports, 
academic research, and findings from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were consulted. Rural 
populations’ perceptions of the impacts of large-scale land acquisitions and information on their 
subsequent mobility patterns were collected in July 2014 through qualitative methods (semi-structured 
interviews and focus groups). For this purpose 45 people effected by nine different agribusinesses,6 
including village chiefs and religious authorities, were interviewed. Participants were selected through 
snowball sampling while making sure that the people selected were not only affected differently by each 
project (for example, directly or indirectly) but also presented different sociodemographic characteristics. 
Their opinions were complemented by 18 expert interviews with researchers, authorities, NGOs, 
journalists, and peasant organizations both in Dakar and Saint-Louis. Content analysis of the gathered data 
                                                        
 
4. This fieldwork was funded by the Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research (FNRS) within a PhD research 
fellowship.  
5. In the period 2000–07 there were six private investment deals concerning 168,964 hectares; between 2008 and 
2011, 30 more deals involving 630,012 hectares were registered. The total land purchased in large-scale land 
acquisitions is now estimated at 844,970 hectares (Sy, Cissé, and Ba 2013).  
6. Anonymization of the companies involved is required since further research in the same region will provide the 
explicit opinions of those companies to help counterbalance these findings. It is not the aim of this section to 
criminalize any particular company or to state that the population’s perceptions alone reveal the complexity of the 
matter at hand.  
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allowed general shared perceptions on environmental vulnerability, impacts of large-scale land 
acquisitions, and migratory trends to be established. 
5.2.4 Findings  
Environmental problems are of great concern for local populations that notice a much later arrival of the 
rainy season and its shorter duration. Even though access to fresh water resources (Lac de Guiers and the 
Senegal River), which was facilitated by the construction of two dams in the late 1980s, has allowed some 
of them to reduce their dependence on rainfall through irrigation systems, family farming in the region still 
remains difficult because of the lack of access to credit, state subsidies, and adequate means (pesticides, 
fertilizers, machinery, and so forth). As a consequence of these factors, rural exodus has historically 
constituted an important livelihood diversification strategy.  
 
However, the arrival of agribusinesses in the region initially spawned a return of locals that had migrated 
elsewhere in search of other job opportunities. The promises of employment and infrastructure gave hope 
to populations that initially viewed private investment as a way to improve their resilience to preexisting 
environmental and socioeconomic vulnerabilities while allowing them to stay in their communities of 
origin. However, out-migration followed shortly because of the population’s disappointment with the 
companies’ actions. Respondents unanimously reported scarce employment opportunities, with those 
available being unstable, offering very low wages, and not prioritizing local employment. As one village 
chief explained, “People are leaving because they cannot find a job in the area. This should be the other 
way around!” Furthermore, the promises of infrastructure development (such as schools, roads, 
dispensaries, hospitals) have rarely been kept. Locals, especially young men, thus continue to leave for 
Mauritania—especially Nouakchott—Dakar, and the city of Saint-Louis. Many of these migrants have 
difficulty finding employment in these already socially and environmentally vulnerable cities and often have 
to settle in slums, which can further reduce their resilience to future environmental shocks. Conversely, 
women that previously migrated to Mauritania as care workers have increasingly returned to the region to 
work for some of the agribusinesses. Although women also report difficult working conditions, they claim 
having accepted employment because it provides them with the opportunity to stay near their families. 
 
Furthermore, vulnerability to socio-environmental changes has been further compounded by destructive 
environmental practices undertaken by the agribusinesses that have led to deforestation and the pollution 
of their basic productive assets. The pollution of water resources and contamination of grazing lands have 
added increasing constraints to already vulnerable livelihoods with considerable impacts on their 
productivity that could lead to increasing rural exodus in the future. Because mobility is inherent to their 
livelihoods, it is pastoralists that have suffered the most immediate effects. With the parceling of land and 
building of fences, they are now obliged to cross great distances to access grazing land and water for their 
herds. Their seasonal transhumant mobility has become increasingly permanent. Although longer distance 
and more permanent pastoralist mobility is the general trend, some pastoralists have become increasingly 
immobile, becoming “trapped” within project boundaries.  
 
It is also important to note that agribusinesses have also attracted populations from the inner regions of 
Senegal (Fouta, Kaolack, Casamance, Fatick, Diourbel) who, given their sole dependence on rain-fed 
agriculture, are even more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. For these populations, their lack of 
access to socioeconomic capital is compounded by a lack of access to water resources and increased rainfall 
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variability. Populations from these regions thus engage increasingly in seasonal agricultural labor migration 
to this region as a way to better diversify their livelihoods. Their relative lack of socioeconomic and 
environmental assets compounded by increased competition in urban areas for low-skilled jobs make 
sectoral mobility more difficult. With further projected climate change impacts on rainfall variability in the 
years to come, greater in-migration from particularly environmentally vulnerable areas can also be 
expected. Whether employment in such agribusinesses will continue to provide them with a livelihood 
diversification strategy remains to be seen since many of the agribusiness are increasingly technology 
rather than labor dependent. 
5.2.5 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
To fully understand how mobility will be increasingly affected by climate change impacts, it is essential to 
acknowledge how the environment interacts with other factors, such as large-scale land acquisitions, that 
can further increase the vulnerability of populations while decreasing their resilience to future 
environmental and socioeconomic shocks. In a region where rainfall variability places considerable strains 
on livelihoods, environmental degradation resulting from harmful corporate practices and the loss of 
customary land all have the potential to increase rural exodus while continuously affecting pastoralists’ 
daily mobility. Trying to artificially isolate the environmental variable from other major socioeconomic and 
political factors will not only hinder the understanding of migration but will also translate into inadequate 
protection mechanisms and development policies.  
 
Findings show that the interaction between environmental vulnerability and large-scale land acquisitions 
can have both short-term and long-term impacts on population movements. The complex manner in which 
such variables interact across environmentally fragile areas shows that a more nuanced understanding is 
needed between the two extremes of a “win-win” scenario, in which rising employment opportunities 
would reduce rural exodus, and the dispossession and expulsion scenario, in which people would be 
automatically displaced. Although “agro-industrial development” in the delta is providing a diversification 
strategy for some rain-fed dependent farmers from other regions of Senegal, local populations would much 
rather benefit from state-subsidized irrigation schemes and secure access to fertile land. Continued large-
scale land acquisitions that overlook customary rights and fail to develop environmentally sustainable 
practices or provide viable livelihood diversification strategies for environmentally and socioeconomically 
vulnerable populations will increase competition for natural resources while decreasing the resilience of 
rural communities and affect investment viability in the long term. Transparency in negotiations, respect 
for existing land rights, sharing of benefits, environmental sustainability, and adherence to national trade 
policies are the most frequently addressed challenges in global and national land-governance norms.7 Yet, 
such principles still fail to question agro-industrial development per se (Borras and Franco 2014), as if 
supporting other possible development pathways, such as smallholder agriculture, would not be better 
suited to increasing the resilience capacities of already environmentally vulnerable rural populations and 
to preventing possible forced displacement or the “trapping” of pastoralists. The voluntary nature of such 
principles and their subsequent lack of national and local implementation remain considerable challenges 
                                                        
 
7. FAO, IFAD, UNCTAD and the World Bank (PRAI) have developed sets of principles for responsible agricultural 
investment. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the African Union, the African Development Bank, 
and the EU have also developed frameworks and guidelines. 
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that need to be urgently addressed. Finally, a better understanding of migration flows at a time when 
climate change will compound preexisting vulnerabilities is essential to developing the social provisions and 
infrastructure that will make receiving areas resilient to growing demographic and environmental 
pressures. To diminish the negative impacts that environmental degradation poses to traditional 
livelihoods, land governance policies and land use plans need to take future environmental degradation 
into account. The protection of housing, land, and property rights as well as appropriate natural resource 
governance will increasingly condition the vulnerability and resilience of populations to socio-
environmental changes in general and to climate change in particular. 
 
5.3    The Settlement Dynamics of Populations Vulnerable to Erosion in Cotonou’s Coastal Zone 
   (Benin) 
5.3.1 Context 
In the 21st century, the effects of global warming could be particularly disastrous for coastal areas, among 
others those located on the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa. The coast of Cotonou, the economic capital of 
Benin, has recorded significant coastal erosion for several decades, mainly due to the obstruction of the 
littoral transit by the harbor built in 1962 and the decrease in sedimentary inputs from the west caused by 
diverse coastal protection structures. Moreover, sand quarries operated directly on the beach have 
amplified erosion. Like most other coastal nations, a high proportion of the population is located on the 
coast. The vulnerability is exacerbated by rapid demographic growth and inadequate resources for urban 
development. In the future, the process will very likely be amplified by sea level rise and more frequent 
storms as consequences of global warming (Ozer et al. 2013). 
 
This study examines population dynamics in a section of the coastal zone of Cotonou that is exposed to 
rapid erosion. The aims were to determine the vulnerability of populations in the risk zone and to analyze 
the responses of the authorities to underline the needs in the context of climate change, since global 
warming is responsible for sea level rise that accelerates the shoreline erosion process. 
5.3.2 Methods 
To assess the eroded area in the six kilometers directly east of the harbor infrastructure and to observe the 
human settlement dynamics next to the sea, multitemporal analyses of very high-resolution satellite images 
from Google Earth (2002, 2011, and 2013) were carried out. The analyses were complemented with field 
missions in September 2012, September 2013, and July 2014. This field work consisted of discussions with 
institutional actors, local authorities, and researchers and of some 20 interviews with affected people.  
5.3.3 Findings 
Coastal erosion and settlement dynamics  
 
Between 1963 and 1997, the coastline retreated by 400 meters at the east of the harbor of Cotonou (Codjia 
1997). Diachronic analyses of satellite images show that the sea eroded approximately 75 hectares of land 
between 2002 and 2013. This area corresponds to a coastline retreat of 125 meters in 12 years (Figure 1). 
Coastal erosion is observed up to the Nigerian border, which is 27 kilometers east of Cotonou, with erosion 
of 30 meters in 10 years recorded at the border.  
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Figure 1. Coastal Erosion around Cotonou, 2002–13 
 
In some zones, a progressive replacement of parceled or standing houses by makeshift houses between 2002 and 
2011 can be observed. Furthermore, between 2011 and 2013 images reveal a rapid destruction of some of these 
newly constructed houses.  
 
Migrants and trapped populations 
 
Results from fieldwork show that people with sufficient financial or social capital left the coastal zone when 
their houses were threatened by the sea. According to evidence, they relocated inland, usually to the 
peripheral areas of Cotonou. People remaining in the risk zone were mainly fishermen and precarious 
populations. Fishermen (or their parents) are native to the region of Grand-Popo (on the coast 90 
kilometers to the west of Cotonou) and arrived in the coastal zone of Cotonou in the 1970s to enjoy better 
living conditions and more employment opportunities. However, since their arrival they have been 
successively displaced along the coastal zone because of the sea’s encroachment. The resulting loss of 
assets and capital necessary for constructing a new home caused their vulnerability to increase with each 
move. There are two groups of precarious populations in the zone. On the one hand are people who lost 
their homes to the sea, causing them to fall into poverty. On the other hand, poor people moved into the 
risk zone because they had no money to pay rent elsewhere in the city. Both groups feared being displaced 
by the sea. Unlike fishermen who want to stay near the shoreline for their economic activities, the 
precarious populations want to leave the coastal area but lack the financial capital and social networks to 
do so. Results highlight the increasing vulnerability of populations as the sea continues to advance and a 
2002 2013 
0 100 m 
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concomitant decrease in their resilience capacities. The poorest people are forced to stay in the risk zone, 
becoming “trapped” populations (Foresight 2011). Without sufficient resources or other viable alternatives, 




In the national strategy to implement the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Benin proposed 
two adaptation options: (1) stabilizing the coastline by building groynes (rigid hydraulic structures built out 
from an ocean shore that interrupt water flows and limits the movement of sediment, thereby reducing 
erosion), and (2) relocating activities, communications, transport, hotel infrastructure, and communities 
out of the risk zone. Under the pressure of local environmental NGOs, all marine sand quarries were closed 
in March 2009. Since May 2014, seven groynes have been built in the most exposed zone for a cost of 45.4 
milliards FCFA, financed by several investors (essentially Middle Eastern states’ funds). At a scale of a 
groyne, positive effects are observed at the west of the structure but negative effects (fast erosion) appear 
at the east. However, where the seven groynes have been placed, the problem has been transferred to the 
neighboring municipality. The installation of such protection structures restores confidence to investors 
who are starting to build new standing houses in the zone protected by the groynes. 
5.3.4 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Habitat regulations and land use planning that would address settlement in the risk zone are absent. Some 
laws and decrees have not been respected and others are inadequate and should be revised or updated. 
Additionally, local populations are often unaware of existing legal mechanisms and regulations. Although 
the Cotonou town council wants to solve the erosion problem while avoiding displacement of their 
residents, they have few resources within their reach. They place their hopes on the groynes but realize 
that their effectiveness will only be proven over time, and furthermore, that even then the problem will be 
transferred to the neighboring municipality. Meanwhile, local authorities have been trying to persuade 
fishermen to relocate away from the sea but without offering compensation or assistance. However, they 
turn a blind eye to informal settlements because they have no alternative to propose. 
In addition to the need for local solutions, coastal erosion is not confined to this zone, therefore the 
development of international cooperation with other countries in the Gulf of Guinea is necessary. Benin, 
like the other 10 coastal countries of West Africa, has adopted a master plan for coastal development with 
the support of the West African Economic and Monetary Union but implementation of the 
recommendations must be consistent within the region. Consultation with affected populations is also 
needed (Teka and Vogt 2010). 
6. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
Climate change's effects on West African mobility cannot be isolated to a single outcome. Environmental 
degradation, whether resulting from slow-onset changes or sudden shocks, affects populations' 
vulnerability and resilience capacity in complex ways. These complexities stem from, and result in, varied 
and cumulative vulnerability and resilience among and within West African populations. First, the presence 
of multiple environmental trends and shocks varies geographically. While desertification and droughts are 
of prime importance for some, floods, coastal erosion, and sea level rise are the main hazards for others. 
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Even within local populations affected by the same climatic threats, their vulnerability and likelihood to 
migrate are affected by their socioeconomic status (with those having some form of financial and social 
capital more able to adapt locally or through migration), their dependence on natural resources, and their 
demographic characteristics (age, gender, and so on). The complex links that emerge between 
environmental degradation, vulnerability, and migratory patterns are further exemplified through the 
added pressures of large-scale acquisitions of agricultural land. Fishing communities equally encounter 
compounded environmental and socioeconomic pressures with changes in maritime resources affecting 
livelihoods and coastal erosion and sea level rise threatening their places of residence. Together, cumulated 
vulnerabilities increasingly shape differentiated mobility outcomes and consequential capacities for 
resilience.  
A comprehensive understanding of how environmental vulnerabilities compound preexisting vulnerabilities 
is essential to the formulation of useful responses. Given the differentiated vulnerabilities and capacities 
for resilience, there is no one-size-fits-all solution. Policy must be adapted and implemented according to 
particular populations and needs. Strategies will need to take into account geographical and climatic 
variations, but also differences in socioeconomic vulnerability to build resilience. However, regional 
cooperation is still needed. Although specific threats may be local, climate change stimulates internal and 
international migration that will affect all the countries of West Africa. 
However, along with taking into account differences in vulnerability and subsequent migration decisions 
among and within local populations, policy makers must also consider vulnerability as it is perceived by 
those affected. Therefore, environmental mobility cannot be treated as a strictly rational behavior based 
on actual vulnerability, as if local populations’ perceptions of environmental threats and changes 
necessarily correspond to meteorologically observed climatic trends or their causes. Furthermore, all of the 
components (environmental, political, economic, demographic, and so on) of perceived vulnerability 
among local populations must be analyzed because they together inform people’s subsequent (im)mobility 
behaviors and intentions. Building resilience among local populations therefore requires that perceived and 
actual vulnerability be assessed, and local populations must be educated about current and expected 
changes to their natural environments to facilitate better-informed mobility decisions. 
Just as the relationship between vulnerability and mobility outcomes varies among and within the 
presented case studies, so too does the impact of environmental mobility on individual, household, and 
community resilience. Again, it is important to consider how people's mobility decisions are based on their 
expectations of the outcomes of these movements. Although migration may be perceived to increase 
individual and household resilience to socio-environmental changes, it may in fact place them at further 
risk in the destination area. For example, the heavy erosion of the coast of Cotonou has caused the 
voluntary migration of those with capital and the displacement of fishermen, but also an in-migration of 
poor populations who despite the risk, cannot afford to live elsewhere. Their preexisting economic 
vulnerability is then compounded by environmental hazards in the migratory destination. Furthermore, 
regional rural-to-urban migration does not always provide better conditions for migrants, who may struggle 
to find employment in destination areas and often move into slums and makeshift housing in urban 
peripheries. These living conditions can exacerbate environmental risks and health hazards.  
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However, migration can also offer a significant tool with which local populations can increase their 
resilience to socio-environmental changes. With local livelihoods increasingly difficult to maintain, out-
migration of youth from rural villages in the region of Saint-Louis decreases household reliance on 
agriculture, for example. At the same time, populations that depend solely on rain-fed agriculture in the 
interior of Senegal, who are particularly vulnerable to climate change, diversify their livelihoods by moving 
into these rural villages to work for agribusinesses. Similarly, on the West African coast, Guet Ndarian 
fishing migration to Mauritania generates remittances used to support households in the community of 
origin, and, for the most successful, remittances enable households to escape the threat of coastal erosion 
and sea level rise by building new homes in safer areas of Saint-Louis.  
West African cities, already struggling with economic, demographic, and environmental pressures, will only 
see their vulnerability compounded with future climate change. Building infrastructure and establishing 
protection mechanisms for migrants and displaced persons is thus a necessary step in mitigating future 
risk. Although it is of the utmost importance that national adaptation plans in West Africa incorporate 
mobility (Warner et al. 2014), they also offer an encouraging platform for the strengthening or 
establishment of appropriate institutional arrangements to address increasing environmental vulnerability 
and to build populations’ resilience to future shocks (UNFCCC 2014). In conclusion, regional authorities 
must work together to build the resilience of sending communities to climatic shocks, but they must also 
facilitate migration as an adaptation strategy by, for example, recognizing the development potential of 
remittances. In addition, to avoid adverse migration outcomes, they must prepare destination areas 
(especially coastal urban centers) to receive internal and international migrants, but they must also better 
inform those living and migrating to risk zones about the potential risks of (im)mobility in and out of these 
areas. These policy interventions may help decrease the potential for the creation of “trapped” populations 
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